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 7 
While Clayton et al. (2012) rightly highlight the differences and tensions in the ethical justifications 8 
utilized by what they refer to as the AAP/ACMG and ACMG ES/GS recommendations, they fall short 9 
in explaining the source of these differences. Only once the source of the differences is correctly 10 
identified and explored, can the implications of tensions between the two sets of recommendations 11 
be addressed: that is, whether or not they need agree. 12 
 13 
We argue that the differences largely rest on the implied methodologies underlying the two 14 
guidelines. The AAP/ACMG recommendations make use of the results of empirical ethics involving a 15 
range of stakeholders, a methodology which the ACMG ES/GS guideline ignores. Clayton et al. 16 
describe how the former recommendations on predictive genetic testing and screening of children 17 
situate themselves within the professional tradition and empirical research on how adults and 18 
families respond to predictive testing. The latter recommendations in contrast make no reference to 19 
either this professional tradition or empirical research in justifying their position. These 20 
recommendations appear to have been inspired mainly by the views of some medical professionals, 21 
without taking into account all the other stakeholders who will be impacted by the guidelines. This 22 
lacuna severely weakens the persuasiveness of the ACMG ES/GS recommendations. 23 
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 24 
So-called “empirical ethics” involves bringing general principles and particular judgements or 25 
experiences into conversation with each other, with the aim of advancing in ethical reflection 26 
(Schotsmans, 1999). Neither the normative nor the empirical should be given undue weight, but both 27 
should be allowed to inform and challenge each other. A prerequisite is an accurate description of 28 
the context (Borry et al., 2004). The context of the AAP/ACMG recommendations is a positive family 29 
history, in which both children and adults will know that they can choose to request testing once 30 
they are over majority. The ACMG ES/GS recommendations assume no positive family history. 31 
Consequently, the disclosure of an incidental finding discovered in the child is the only way that the 32 
rest of the family will know that they might want to get tested. (Incidentally, if a positive family 33 
history were to be present, the context reverts to one similar to that of the AAP/ACMG 34 
recommendations; this would only come to light if clinicians and laboratory staff were in 35 
communication about the patients, a possibility which does not seem to be explored in the present 36 
guidelines.) Other aspects of the context remain to be specified. For instance, are we to assume the 37 
current situation, where ES/GS is mainly ordered for children in cases of serious developmental 38 
disabilities or congenital anomalies, i.e. in cases where the family already has to deal with a severe 39 
clinical condition? There is additionally the justice and practical question of who will finance the extra 40 
laboratory work-up. It will be helpful to get some idea of the scale of impact of the guidelines, by 41 
looking for instance at the expected proportion of actionable, pathogenic incidental findings based 42 
on current, admittedly limited databases (e.g. Dorschner et al., 2013), and by clarifying how far 43 
investigations of relatives should go to determine the clinical significance of a suspected incidental 44 
finding (Crawford et al., 2013).Ethically sound guidelines should also keep in mind the consequences 45 
at each step of the disclosure process: from laboratory to clinician, from clinician to parents, and, 46 
perhaps most crucially, from parents to children. 47 
 48 
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Once the context has been delimited in as detailed a way as possible, normative and empirical 49 
explorations can be brought into the conversation. While there are numerous guidelines and 50 
normative position papers arguing against predictive testing of children for adult-onset disorders, 51 
which the AAP/ACMG recommendations make use of, there are other arguments encouraging early 52 
predictive testing (Rhodes, 2006). The accompanying technical report of the AAP/ACMG allows for 53 
exceptions depending on the family’s motivation, context, and understanding. The question is 54 
whether the exception can ever become the rule. The ACMG ES/GS recommendations take the 55 
family as the basic unit of clinical care rather than the child. Some recent clinical literature supports 56 
viewing incidental findings in children of adult-onset conditions as family matters (May et al., 2013). 57 
Another relevant line of inquiry is whether the so-called “right not to know” that some parents or 58 
children (or future adult children) may wish to claim, is valid in the case of actionable, pathogenic 59 
incidental findings. Naysayers include those who argue that such ignorance can be harmful, those 60 
who argue that such ignorance is opposed to autonomy, and those who argue that the discussion 61 
should move to harms and benefits at an inter-subjective level (Wilson, 2005). The normative ethical 62 
work is yet to be done, not just to shore up arguments defending the ACMG’s latest position but also 63 
to justify the apparent radical break with former recommendations. 64 
 65 
Helpful in this process are empirical investigations of the values and motivations relevant to 66 
stakeholders in the context of pediatric genetic incidental findings. Stakeholders include medical 67 
professionals, laboratory personnel, parents, families, and children (if possible). Such investigations 68 
can clarify the weighting of various normative positions. In this respect, it is not enough simply to 69 
know whether parents for instance would accept the consequences of the ACMG ES/GS 70 
recommendations, but also their reasons for doing so. Two recent comparable interview studies 71 
suggest that most parents would appreciate the disclosure of adult-onset, actionable, pathogenic 72 
incidental findings discovered in their children (Sapp et al., 2013; Christenhusz et al., 2014). More 73 
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interesting from an ethical point of view is how parents justified their positions, as well as the sorts 74 
of justifications used by those opposed to disclosure, and the ethical weight that can be ascribed to 75 
each type of argument. Also interesting is our finding that some of those who said that they did not 76 
want certain results disclosed to them, found it unacceptable if the doctor would know something 77 
about their child that they did not (Christenhusz et al., 2014). In other words, they would rather 78 
forgo their “right not to know,” than that the doctor would know a certain unexpected result and not 79 
disclose. A finding like this deserves more investigation. One response is that medical professionals 80 
should be very sure about what they want to discover about their patients; after all, what they do 81 
not know themselves, they cannot disclose.  82 
 83 
We have argued that the main difference between the AAP/ACMG and ACMG ES/GS 84 
recommendations lies in the “missing link” of empirical ethics, and have attempted to show how 85 
normative ethical reflections and empirical investigations could be brought together to flesh out the 86 
ACMG ES/GS recommendations. If it can be shown that different ethical arguments are valid for the 87 
two sets of recommendations, based on justifiably different contexts, it can then be argued that 88 
these evolving, ethically sound, internally consistent guidelines need not agree with each other.  89 
 90 
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